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             Profiles of Dialogue: A Method of Argument Fault Diagnosis and Repair 
 
Abstract                         D. Walton, Argumentation & Advocacy, 52 (2), 2015, 89-106. 
 
This paper builds the profiles of dialogue tool into a fault diagnosis method that can be applied to 
problematic examples of argumentation such as those involving informal fallacies. The profiles method 
works by comparing a descriptive graph with a normative graph. The descriptive graph represents how a 
dialogue sequence actually went in the example chosen for analysis. The normative graph represents an 
analysis of how the sequence should ideally proceed, according to the protocols (rules) for this type of 
dialogue. The descriptive graph is mapped into the normative graph, so that a comparison can be made to 
diagnose the fault in the sequence displayed in the descriptive graph and repair it.  
 
Key Words: informal fallacies; directed graphs; formal models of dialogue; artificial intelligence 
 
     Argumentation, at the current point of its development, is very strong at two ends of the 
spectrum. At the bottom-up end a large corpus of problematic examples of real arguments has 
been analyzed that are, in many instances thought to commit fallacies or admit of other kinds of 
logical and communicative problems. A mass of studies at this end has been carried out by 
applying tools such as argument diagrams to actual cases of real arguments taken from news 
reports, Internet sources such as Debatepedia, legal argumentation and parliamentary and 
congressional debates. At the top-down end, abstract normative models of argumentation have 
been built to formalize structures with dialogue rules (protocols) that stipulate what kinds of 
moves (speech acts) are permissible and obligatory in sequences of argumentative exchanges. 
Formal argumentation systems of this kind have now been constructed in computer science, 
especially in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems, to model argumentative exchanges of 
the kind that take place on the Internet as arguments are put forward by one side and contested 
by the other side. This paper shows how to apply a profiles of dialogue method to real examples 
of argumentation in a text, bringing these two ends closer to working together. 
     In the informal logic textbooks, fallacies were often taken to be arguments that are inherently 
faulty or fallacious. There has been a gradual revolution in the subject starting with (Hamblin, 
1970) moving to the view that such arguments can sometimes be reasonable, in the right context 
of use. The problem then confronted for an argument analyst or critic of an argument is to prove 
by means of objective evidence whether an argument used in a particular case can properly be 
diagnosed as defective or not. Formal dialogue models provide part of the answer at one end by 
using the context to make such evaluations by modeling the abstract conditions under which a 
sequence of argumentation is not fallacious. These models provide rules to determine if the 
dialogue proceeds in the correct order, asking necessary preliminary questions and establishing 
the arguer’s commitments. Using the method of profiles of dialogue developed in this paper, an 
interpretative reconstruction of a given argument used in natural language discourse can be 
abstracted from the actual case using the evidence from the given text of discourse and compared 
to the requirements of the abstract, formal model. It is shown how a formal and computational 
argumentation model called the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS) can not only be used to 
evaluate arguments and to invent new arguments to support a contested claim, but can also 
support the profiles of dialogue method. In section 6, a twelve-step procedure is presented that 
explains how the method can be employed to help an argument analyst to determine whether a 
given argument exhibits faults, such as informal fallacies, that can be diagnosed and even 
repaired. In section 7 it is shown how this method has both normative and descriptive parts. 
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1. Normative and Descriptive Approaches 
 
     Reed et al. (2008, 2) bring out the distinction between the normative and descriptive aspect of 
argumentation by stating that argumentation protocols are specifications of how dialogues are to 
proceed, as contrasted with dialogue histories that are records of how a given dialogues did 
proceed. They maintain that there is a separation between prescriptive normative structures 
defined by abstract procedural rules for formal dialogue systems and the representation of actual 
arguments in actual dialogue histories. It has also been observed (Bruschke, 2004) that there is 
quite a gap between abstract normative structures of the kinds formulated as a formal models that 
represent how argumentation should ideally go, and actual practices of argumentation of the kind 
studied in the literature on public debates and political controversies. These latter kinds of 
studies tend to be more descriptive and empirical in their methods and approaches. 
     The technique of argument diagramming is a normative method of informal logic. An 
argument diagram is composed of two elements (Freeman, 1991): (1) a set of nodes (vertices, 
points) representing the premises and conclusions in the sequence of argumentation in a given 
case, and (2) a set of arrows (lines) representing inferences from premises to conclusions. Each 
arrow basically represents an inference, but the arrows also represent arguments from premises 
to conclusions. In applying the technique, the analyst designates the nodes in the diagram as 
premises or conclusions, based on his or her interpretations of the natural language text of 
discourse that is the target of the analysis. In making the diagram the analyst needs to designate 
one point that is taken to represent the ultimate proposition to be proved or contested. 
     Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) advocated the use of the type of dialogue called the 
critical discussion, which has the goal of resolving a conflict of opinions set at the opening stage. 
They also distinguish a confrontation stage of the dialogue where the participants define the 
goals of the discussion and agree on the dialogue rules. The rules are meant to represent a way of 
codifying the Gricean conversational principles (Grice, 1975). In the argumentation stage both 
parties bring forward arguments to support their individual viewpoints, and have an opportunity 
to criticize the arguments put forward by the other side. On this view (van Eemeren, 2010) the 
argumentation stage of the critical discussion is an adversarial type of dialogue in which there is 
a good deal of strategic maneuvering on both sides so that each side can find the weak points in 
the argumentation of the other side. In the closing stage it is determined whether one side has 
been victorious over the other. The dialogue rules offer a normative model of argumentation. 
     On the formal dialectical approach (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), a dialogue is seen as an 
ordered sequence of moves in which each participant takes a turn in making a move containing a 
speech act. So a dialogue is essentially a sequence of pairs of moves by each side. Attached to 
each side is a set of propositions called a commitment store. At each move, depending on the 
rules of dialogue, propositions are inserted into this set or removed from it. The rules of dialogue 
define the permissible moves, the types of locutions involved in a move, the regulation of 
commitment insertion and deletion, and sequences of moves that fulfill the goals of the dialogue. 
 
2. Formal Dialogue Systems 
 
     Traditionally in the informal logic textbooks, informal fallacies were treated as kinds of 
arguments that are fallacious. This traditional approach was called the standard treatment of 
fallacies by Hamblin (1970), who took a new dialectical approach that linked fallacies to formal 
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dialogue systems. This approach had the implication that the forms of argument associated with 
the traditional fallacies are not necessarily fallacious, leaving us with task of judging in particular 
cases whether a given argument of one of these types is fallacious or not. But Hamblin also 
proposed a framework that was also the beginning of an answer to this question of how to tell 
whether or not a given argument in a natural language text of discourse is fallacious. He 
proposed that the context of the argument can be modeled dialectically using formal dialogue 
systems, and he constructed several simplified formal systems of this sort. Using formal dialogue 
systems was not altogether new, because philosophers and rhetoricians in both the ancient and 
medieval periods widely advocated such a dialectical approach both in rhetoric and applied logic. 
However, Hamblin’s program of applying formalized mathematical dialogue systems to the 
study of informal fallacies was a revolutionary step forward. 
     Hamblin was just at the beginning point of the opening of this new field of investigation. 
While he built mathematical models of formal dialogues based on the traditional Greek models, 
and such systems as the Obligation Game of the Middle Ages, he made no serious attempt to 
take the next step of classifying different types of dialogues and modeling their properties. That 
step was subsequently taken in further studies such as (Walton, 1989) and (Walton and Krabbe, 
1995). This formal dialectical approach advocated the view that argumentation is based on the 
kind of communication that takes place between agents in a dialogue structure. In such a 
structure one agent makes a move, such as putting forward an argument, and the other agent 
takes its turn responding to that move, such as criticizing the argument. A dialogue is defined as 
a 3-tuple: an opening stage, an argumentation stage and a closing stage. In this approach, six 
types of dialogue were initially recognized (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), called information-
seeking, inquiry, persuasion, negotiation, deliberation and eristic dialogue. Another type called 
discovery was added in (Walton, 2013, 9), where the goal is to find a hypothesis to explain some 
a set of facts. Within the computational dialogue classification system of (McBurney and 
Parsons, 2001, 4), the properties of discovery dialogue and inquiry dialogue are different. In an 
inquiry dialogue, the proposition that is to be proved true is designated at the opening stage, 
whereas in a discovery dialogue the hypotheses are tested during the argumentation stage. 
     Dialogues are formal structures defined by a set of initial conditions, a set of goals for each 
agent, and collective dialogue goals binding both (or all all) the agents. An agent can be a human 
or a machine entity, such as a computer program designed to take part in multiagent 
communications on the Internet. It is assumed that each agent has a commitment store, a set of 
propositions it has gone on record in the dialogue as accepting. Each stage has rules (protocols) 
governing the permissible or obligatory activation of a speech act put forward in a move. 
     For example, in a persuasion dialogue the proponent has a thesis (claim) that it needs to prove 
by a sequence of logical reasoning in order to win. To win, the respondent needs to cast 
sufficient doubt on the proponent’s proof by undercutting it, or produce a stronger argument for 
the negation of the proponent’s claim. The collective goal of a persuasion dialogue is to resolve 
the conflict of opinions expressed at the opening stage by testing the one argument against the 
other. The global burden of proof, called the burden of persuasion in a persuasion dialogue, 
requires that the proponent has a thesis to be proved. The default burden of persuasion applicable 
in a typical case is set by the preponderance of evidence standard, essentially meaning that the 
stronger argument wins. Meeting this burden of persuasion is determined by coming up with a 
strong enough argument using a chain of argumentation in which individual arguments in the 
chain are of the proper sort (Prakken, 2006). Determining which argument is stronger requires 
that the entire sequence of argumentation on each sides needs to be evaluated. So argument 
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evaluation is essential for determining whether the burden of persuasion has been met. The same 
is true with the other types of dialogue. Evaluating the argumentation on both sides, or on all 
sides in a multiagent dialogue exchange with more than two parties, is vitally important.  
     This dialectical approach of using formal dialogue systems to model argumentation has now 
been taken up in computer science, most notably in the fields of artificial intelligence and 
multiagent systems. This research has built formal and computational argumentation models 
representing these different types of dialogue. Formal and computational dialogue systems have 
been widely studied recently as multiagent systems (McBurney and Parsons, 2001).  They 
include formal systems for persuasion dialogue (Prakken, 2006), deliberation, inquiry, 
negotiation and information-seeking dialogue. The critical discussion dialogue of van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst is classified as a subtype of persuasion dialogue. 
     Reed (2011, 5) describes the logical connection between moves in a dialogue sequence as the 
parties in the dialogue put forward assertions and arguments, as well as other kinds of speech 
acts, as dialogue glue. It is this glue that holds the individual speech acts together as the parties in 
the dialogue take turns putting forward as their moves. Asking the question what provides this 
glue, Reed (2011, 5) provides the answer that it is the protocols of the formal dialogue systems. 
Argument protocols are essentially specifications determining how such dialogues should 
proceed ideally in order to move forward toward a collective goal, such as resolving a conflict of 
opinions by using rational argumentation. For example, pre and post-conditions define what 
kinds of speech acts are permitted as communicative moves and what the range of options are for 
the respondent in making a reply at its next move. Protocols are what have so often in the past 
been called the procedural rules of the dialogue system (Walton and Krabbe, 1995).  
     Using these formal argumentation systems one can model the abstract conditions under which 
an argument pattern is not fallacious. If the dialogue proceeds in the correct order stipulated by 
the protocols, asking the necessary preliminary questions, establishing the arguer’s 
commitments, and only putting forward moves that fit the speech acts defined by the protocols, 
and that are connected together only in ways permitted by the protocols, an argument used in that 
setting can be shown to be not fallacious. But we are still left with the problem of applying the 
formal dialogue systems to instances of natural language argumentation where we suspect that a 
fallacy has been committed, and show decisively using the formal model that of fallacy has been 
committed in this particular case. This is sometimes called the problem of pinning down a fallacy 
in a particular case where an argument has been put forward in a natural language text.  
     The problem is how an analyst, when trying to analyze or evaluate a particular argument in a 
natural language text, can integrate the formal dialogue system with the data provided by the 
text. From the other side, argumentation scholars and researchers have learned to apply graph 
structures of the kind called argument diagrams or argument maps to instances of real arguments, 
in order to identify such arguments, and to analyze and evaluate them. But there is a large gap in 
the middle. How can the resources provided by the formal dialogue systems be integrated with 
the argument graphs and the textual data provided at the ground level by an argument graph? 
This paper provides a solution to the problem by using a device called a profile of dialogue, 
defined (Walton, 1989, 38) as a selected sequence of moves embedded in a longer sequence of 
moves in a dialogue exchange. This solution enables a graph structure to be abstracted from the 
case of actual argumentation so that the argument analysts can compare it to key elements of the 
abstract model of dialogue using a second graph structure. The pair of graphs is used as a tool to 
help determine whether the argument is fallacious or not in the given case. 
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3. Arguments Modeled as Graphs 
 
     A graph is defined mathematically as a set of vertices, also called points or nodes, and a set of 
edges, also called lines or arcs. Technically a graph G is defined as an ordered pair (V, E), where 
the set E is comprised of the two-element subsets of V (Harary, 1972, 9).  In other words, an 
edge is seen as a relation between two vertices, represented as a pair of vertices. The graph is 
called a directed graph if every pair of its elements (V, E) is an ordered pair. In an undirected 
graph, the elements are not ordered pairs, but are merely sets of vertices. A mixed graph is one in 
which some of the edges can be directed while other can be undirected. Graphs can be infinite, 
but the ones dealt with here are finite. It is customary to represent a graph as a diagram.  
     Three examples of diagrams representing directed graphs, also called digraphs, are shown in 
figure 1. Each vertex has been assigned a number, and each edge is shown as an arrow joining a 
vertex to another vertex. These three diagrams all represent complete graphs, meaning that each 
pair of vertices is joined by an edge. Graphs such as these three are familiar to those of us 
working in argumentation. They can be seen as argument diagrams. Each number shown in a 
vertex represents a proposition in what is called a key list, a list of propositions making up the 
premises and conclusions in a given argument. Each arrow represents an inference from one 
proposition to another.  
 
 
 
                                         Figure 1: Three Argument Graphs 
 
The graph on the left represents a single argument. A premise 2 supports the conclusion 1. The 
figure in the middle is a linear graph, meaning that the vertices can be listed as 1,2, . . ., n, 
representing a linear structure. This type of argument is called a serial argument in informal 
logic. The premise 5 supports the conclusion 4, and then 4 is reused as a premise to support 
conclusion 3. In the figure on the right, premise 7 supports conclusion 6 and premise 8 also 
supports the same conclusion. Premise 8 is supported by another argument with 9 as its premise. 
This figure also contains a serial argument of the kind represented in the middle figure. 
     A graph with no cycles is called a tree. The figure on the right is a typical tree, and box 6 is 
called the root of the tree. The part of it where the two premises 7 and 8 support the conclusion 6 
is problematic from a point of view of argument diagramming. The graph figure on the right 
does not tell us whether this argument from 7 and 8 to 6 is a linked argument or a convergent 
argument. In a linked argument, both premises go together to support the conclusion, whereas in 
a convergent argument each premise independently supports the conclusion. Standard argument 
diagramming representations indicate this distinction on the diagram in various ways. However, 
most of them make the resulting argument diagram into something that is not graph. Next we 
will examine a formal argumentation system that draws representations of arguments as graphs 
while still enabling this distinction to be modeled in the graph. It does this by using what is 
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called a bipartite graph, and this method has several additional advantages shown below. One of 
the most important advantages is that it enables the argumentation in a graph to be evaluated. 
 
4. Profiles of Dialogue 
 
     A profile of dialogue as defined in (Walton, 1989, 3) is a selected sequence of moves 
embedded in a longer sequence of moves in a dialogue exchange between two or more parties. 
The motivating idea is that the selected local sequence fits into a longer sequence, so that the 
local sequence can be made sense of and analyzed by fitting it into the longer sequence. 
Generally the longer sequence is itself some selected part of the argumentation stage. In 
principle, a longer sequence could stretch from the opening stage of the dialogue to the closing 
stage. However, when using the profile of dialogue as a working tool for the study of 
argumentation, its purpose might be defeated if it went all the way from the opening to the 
closing stage. Customarily, the longer sequence does not need to be very much longer than the 
selected local sequence. Defined in this way, the profile of dialogue has already been used to 
analyze fallacies and other problems that occur in natural language argumentation. 
     Schlegloff (1988, 56) employed techniques in linguistics similar to profile reconstruction in 
order to study sequences of question-reply exchanges to investigate how a repair is made by one 
party to a misunderstanding shown by the other party in a dialogue. Krabbe (1992) used the 
profiles of dialogue to analyze cases where relevance or irrelevance of an argument is a problem. 
He described profiles of dialogue as “tree-shaped descriptions of sequences of dialectic moves 
that display the various ways a reasonable dialogue could proceed” (Krabbe (1992, 277). On his 
account, the advantage of using the profiles method is that it enables the analysis of dialectical 
fallacies and critical moves without going through all the technical preliminaries that would be 
required to apply a formal dialogue system. 
     This early version of the profiles method was used in Walton (1989, 37-39) to analyze cases 
thought to be associated with what was traditionally called the fallacy of many questions. An 
example is the question ‘Have you stopped stealing funds from your clients?’ The tricky thing 
about evaluating the funds-stealing question is that it is context-dependent, depending on the 
dialogue it is supposedly part of, and depending on presuppositions that may have been incurred 
as commitments prior to the part of the dialogue where the question was posed. Thus asking such 
a question is not fallacious in every instance. For example an attorney cross-examining a 
defendant could quite legitimately ask such a question in a trial provided the defendant has 
previously admitted stealing funds from his clients in the past. For an account of the standard 
treatment of these and related traditional fallacies, see (Hamblin, 1970). 
     These early uses of profiles of dialogue can be made into a generalizable method that has a 
special structure as a method of fault diagnosis more broadly useful for argumentation studies by 
extending the previous way of dealing the fallacy of many questions. How this is done can be 
illustrated using the funds-stealing example. The problem with evaluating the funds-stealing 
question as fallacious or not is that the question does not fit into a reasonable order of 
questioning and answering in the context of dialogue. To see why, you must compare the context 
of the asking of the question to a profile of reasonable question-answer sequence for that context.  
Then it can be seen whether or not the question asked violates the reasonable order of dialogue. 
The funds-stealing question, if it to be seen as a reasonable question, presupposes that the 
respondent has already given or is committed to affirmative answers to two prior questions asked 
in the following order:  (1) Do you have clients you are having financial dealings with?  (2)  
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Have you ever stolen funds from these clients?  If these two questions have not been asked and 
answered first, then the funds-stealing question violates rules of reasonable dialogue indicated by 
the proper sequence shown in the profile.  
    The diagram in figure 2 shows the actual sequence of dialogue in the graph on the left. On the 
right is a graph indicating the proper ordering of the sequence of moves in the dialogue implicit 
in the argumentation in the example. 
 
 
 
                  Figure 2: Applying the Profiles Method in the Funds-stealing Example 
 
The reasonableness of the funds-stealing question can be evaluated by comparing the two graphs 
in figure 2. This comparison is the basis of the profiles technique. The funds-stealing question is 
only asked in the right graph once the two questions above it have been asked and given 
affirmative answers by the respondent. In contrast, in the left graph, as shown above the funds-
stealing question, these two prior questions were never asked and replied to with answers that 
would make the dialogue move forward constructively.  
     The graph on the left in figure 2 represents a description of what literally happens as the 
moves are made by the two parties. When confronted with the question of whether he has 
stopped stealing funds from his clients, the respondent has only two choices, yes or no, if he is to 
give a direct answer to the question. No matter which answer he gives, he automatically becomes 
committed to the proposition that he has stolen funds from these clients. At this point in the 
dialogue, the questioner is justified in accusing the respondent of having committed the crime of 
theft. At that point, presumably, the dialogue stops, and the respondent is left no further options 
for attempting to deny that he stole funds from his clients. 
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    The graph on the right in figure 2 represents a normative analysis of how the sequence of 
questions and replies should have properly proceeded in order to offer the respondent the options 
needed to avoid the trap (fallacy) shown in the figure on the left. The same question, ‘Have you 
stopped stealing funds from your clients?’, that occurred at the top of the diagram on the left 
reappears in the diagram on the right. However in the graph on the right, before the question 
‘Have you stopped stealing funds from your clients?’ appears, two prior questions need to be 
asked and answered. The first one is whether the respondent has clients he is having financial 
dealings with. The second one is the question of whether the respondent has ever stolen funds 
from these clients. These two questions have to be asked in the right order, as shown in the 
graph. Only if both are answered affirmatively can the main question, ‘Have you stopped 
stealing funds from your clients?’ properly be asked. If the answer given by the respondent to 
either of the two prior questions is ‘no’, the dialogue immediately stops once this answer has 
been given. However, once the dialogue gets to the point where this main question is put to him, 
the same outcome as pictured in the figure on the left occurs, no matter how the respondent 
proceeds beyond that point in the dialogue. 
     Even though the outcome is the same in both dialogues, how the sequence of dialogue moves 
up to the point where the main question is asked is different. It is this difference that enables an 
explanation of the fallacy of many questions to be given. The graph on the left represents a 
sequence of questions and replies describing what actually happened in the text representing the 
argumentation in the case to be analyzed. The graph on the right represents a normative model of 
how that sequence of questions and replies should have proceeded in a way that is more rational. 
Hence as illustrated in this example, the profiles method requires a comparison of the two graphs 
shown in figure 2. The graph on the left shows how the sequence actually went in the real 
conversational exchange. The graph on the right represents a normative model specifying how 
the sequence of argumentation in the dialogue should ideally have proceeded. When compared, 
the two graphs indicate how the exchange is problematic. The graph on the left represents a 
sequence of dialogue exchanges that did not offer the respondent an adequate array of options to 
avoid being hemmed in by the overly aggressive questioner. 
     The profiles shown in figure 2 explain the fallacy, thus enabling someone to gasp what the 
failure is in this kind of case. It also offers resources for repairing the fault by indicate the right 
questions in the sequence of argumentation that should take place before the main question is 
asked.  
     
5. Profiles for Burden of Proof Problems 
 
     Another problem that can potentially be solved by applying the profiles technique is the 
shifting of the burden of proof in cases where an attempt is made to avoid a reasonable burden of 
proof requirement. Hamblin (1970, 265-276) built a simple formal dialectical system, called a 
Why-Because System with Questions, designed to show that problems of organizing 
commitments can be solved. There are two participants called White and Black. White moves 
first, and then the two parties must take turns making moves. The language is that of 
propositional calculus, but it could be any other logical system with a finite set of atomic 
statements (Hamblin, 1970, 265). As each party moves, statements are either inserted into or 
retracted from the commitment set of the party who made the move. A record of each party’s 
commitments is kept throughout the dialogue and updated at each move. At each move Black 
and White are allowed to make moves called locutions. Nowadays we would say that these 
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moves take the form of speech acts and that Black and White are agents, entities that can carry 
out communicative actions. Despite his formal orientation, Hamblin (1970, 216) pointed out that 
the study of dialectical systems to model fallacies can be formal or descriptive. 
     In the account of formal modeling of dialogues that follows, ‘statement’ is taken to be 
equivalent to ‘proposition’. P1, P2, …, Pn denote statements. An assertion is defined as a type of 
speech act containing a proposition, the proposition that has been asserted by the agent. So 
conceived, an assertion has three components: (1) the agent that made the assertion, (2) the 
proposition that was asserted, and (3) the move in an orderly dialogue at which the assertion was 
made. Speech acts of the following four kinds are allowed to be put forward in moves. 
 
Assertion: ‘Assertion ASi’ is the speech act of putting forward a statement. When an agent 
asserts a statement, it goes into its commitment set.  
Retraction: ‘No commitment Pi’ is the speech act of retracting a commitment, assuming 
that agent Agi was previously committed to Pi.  
Yes-No Question: ‘Question P1, P2, …, Pn’ is the speech act of asking whether the hearer 
accepts that exactly one of the statements Pi is true. 
Support Request: ‘Why Pi?’ is a request for the other agent to supply an argument that 
would give reason for it to accept Pi. Such an argument needs to have Pi as its conclusion 
and it needs to have one or more premises. 
 
Hamblin (1971, 130) defines a locution-act, which amounts to a speech act used by a participant 
in the dialogue, as a set of participant-locution pairs. To follow but update his framework, a 
move can be defined as a pair 〈Agi, Si〉 with a set of agents 〈Ag1, Ag2, . . ., Agn〉  and a set of speech 
acts 〈AS1,  AS2, . . .,  ASn〉. For example, 〈Ag0, AS4〉 is a speech act where A0 is the first participant 
(White) and AS4 is the fourth type of speech act allowed as a move in the dialogue. For example, 
AS4 may be the speech act of asking of a why-question.  
     For our purposes, as noted above, we can treat the speech act of making an assertion as 
equivalent to the act of making a claim. The important things about making a move fitting this 
speech act are that (i) it commits the speaker to the statement made, and (ii) it represents a strong 
form of commitment that commits the speaker to defending the claim, if asked to do so (Walton 
and Krabbe, 1995). So for our purposes we can work with what we will call a Why-Because 
System, a simple system that has only assertions, retractions and support requests, but that can be 
made more complex by the addition of other speech acts and rules. 
     Hamblin (1970, 166) also discussed a number of syntactical rules for his Why-Because 
System with Questions. Two of these rules are especially significant. They can be formulated as 
follows, where Q is the questioner, R is the respondent, and Pi is a proposition. 
 
The Presupposition Rule: Q can only ask ‘Why Pi?’ if R is committed to Pi? 
 
The BoP Rule: If Q asks ‘Why Pi?’, then if R is committed to Pi, R must present an argument for 
Pi or R must retract Pi. 
 
When put into a form suitable for the Why-Because System, Rule 2 can be formulated as the 
follows the 3 Responses Dialogue Rule, as it is called in (Walton, 2014). 
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The 3 Responses Dialogue Rule:  When the questioner asks the question ‘Why Pi?’, the 
respondent must reply by putting forward one of the following three speech acts: (S1): Assertion 
Pi; or (S2) No commitment Pi; or (S3) Statements Pj, Pj → Pi (where → represents the material 
conditional of propositional calculus).  
 
The 3 Responses Dialogue Rule is the rule most closely associated with the requirement of 
burden of proof (BoP). However, it is not identical to what is widely accepted as the standard 
rule for BoP that requires any party who has made a claim to back up that claim with support if 
challenged to do so by the other party in the dialogue (Walton, 2014). It is different from this 
because it allows the party to whom the why question is addressed the two other options of 
saying ‘Assertion Pi’ or ‘No commitment Pi’. The 3 Responses Dialogue Rule is also obviously 
closely related to the funds-stealing question taken as our example of the fallacy of many 
questions analyzed by the profiles method. 
     As (Krabbe, 1995) observed, the following sequence of dialogue is often associated with the 
fallacy of argument from ignorance. Here, P is a proposition (with no subscript, for simplicity). 
 
White: Assertion P. 
Black: Why-P? 
White: Why not-P? 
 
As shown in (Walton, 2014), this problematic dialogue sequence is also associated with the 
problem of BoP shifting. An example from a parliamentary debate was given.  
     This example (Walton, 2014, 10), is from a debate in the Canadian House of Commons 
concerning a report that Canadian uranium was being used in American nuclear weapons, which 
would violate a treaty between the two countries. The question put to the government 
representative was a request to give reasons to show why he is certain that uranium was not 
being used in this way. The representative replied that he was satisfied that Canadian uranium 
was not being used in this way. An opposition member then asked the question, “What is your 
proof?” The government representative replied that if the opposition members has any 
information that the treaty is not being respected, then they should show why they think that. In 
this kind of case, each side tries to shift BoP back to the other side. 
     This kind of problem, or fallacy, if it is one, can be helpfully configured using the profiles 
tool. In figure 3, following the comparable profile method illustrated in figure 2, the actual 
dialogue is analyzed using the graph on the left and the normative profile showing how the 
dialogue should ideally go is shown by the graph on the right. What this example brings out, as 
shown in figure 3, is something that was already evident, though not as clearly so, in the profile 
for the many questions fallacy shown in figure 2. The graph on the left, in both instances, is not 
purely descriptive, because it also poses a problem. The problem shown by the graph on the left 
in figure 2 was that the respondent is trapped into a situation where he has only two legal replies 
that fit the post-condition for the speech act of asking a yes-no question. This is a problem 
frequently faced every day by those of us filling out automated forms on the Internet where only 
two (or an insufficient number) of response options are allowed. The problem shown in figure 3 
is that both agents, Black and White, are locked into an infinite sequence of moves. 
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               Figure 3: Applying the Profiles Method to the Shifting BoP Example 
 
Looking down the diagram on the left side of figure 3, the directed graph begins with the 
questioner (Q) asking ‘Why P?’, But at its next move in the dialogue respondent (R) replies 
‘Why not-P?’ Supposing that, as would most likely happen in a natural language conversation, 
there was no rule banning this kind of reply. One possible outcome is that it is open for the 
questioner to reply in kind, just as shown in the next move of the dialogue, by asking ‘Why not-
not-P?’. This was the root of the problem posed by the nuclear material example in the Canadian 
parliamentary debate. The problem posed is that, since there is no rule to ban the small dialogue 
(associated with the ad ignorantiam fallacy) that began the sequence, an infinite repetition of a 
sequence of moves was set in motion. In effect the outcome is like a filibuster, where the 
dialogue goes on in a meaningless fashion, blocking any further real progress from being made. 
     But as indicated by the graph shown on the right in figure 3, showing what should ideally 
happen, such an infinite repetition in the dialogue sequence is prohibited. Q can only ask the 
question ‘Why P?’ at the start of the dialogue (shown as the root of the graph) if R is committed 
to P. If R is not committed to P, the Presupposition Rule is violated, and so the original asking of 
the question can be disqualified as a violation of this rule. To show this in the graph, instead of 
putting two prior questions before the why-question, as was done in the profile of figure 2, we 
have invoked the notion of presupposition (Macagno, 2012). However, if Q has made the 
presupposition of ensuring that R is committed to P, then following the BoP rule, Q has to offer 
an argument in support of P. This obligation is essentially the BoP requirement, for as shown by 
the lower left side of the graph shown on the right side of figure 3, if R does not offer an 
argument to support P, it has violated this rule and loses the dialogue. However, unlike the 
sequence shown in the graph on the left side, constructive dialogue is not blocked. Q can go on 
to ask another question and the dialogue can continue, possibly in a constructive manner that will 
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lead to the eventual fulfillment of the dialogue goal set at the opening stage. This is what ideally 
should happen, as opposed to what really did happen, displayed as a graph on the left side. Hence 
the two graphs shown in figure 3 can be used together to repair the fault, which is in this case the 
danger that the dialogue will lead to an infinite sequence of speech acts that will prevent it from 
reaching its proper goal. 
     At the same time, the graph on the left side in figure 3 indicates that there is a complication of 
a kind that is quite tricky to navigate through, and that can easily lead to this infinite dialogue 
sequence. The two burden of proof shifts shown at the top of the left graph in figure 3 can be 
legitimate or illegitimate depending on the type of dialogue that the participants are supposed to 
be taking part in, and the rules governing the speech acts in that type of dialogue (Gordon, 
Prakken and Walton, 2007). The variability of these rules for different types of dialogue was 
already a problem encountered by Hamblin (1970, 271) when he discussed the applicability of 
the following rule: why P may not be used unless P is a commitment of the hearer and not of the 
speaker. As his discussion of this rule reveals, Hamblin was aware that this rule is not applicable 
to all types of dialogues. He was aware of the problematic nature of this rule, as indicated by his 
linking it to several examples of argument in a circle. We now know that whether a burden of 
proof shift should be judged to be legitimate or illegitimate in a given case depends on rules such 
as the presupposition rule, the burden of proof rule and the three responses dialogue rule. 
Whether and how these rules are applicable to a given case cannot be determined by simply 
building a profile of dialogue of the kind illustrated in figure 3. A global burden of proof needs 
to be set at the opening stage of the dialogue (Walton, 2014), and this burden, along with the 
rules governing the speech acts that are permissible in the dialogue, determine whether the 
putting forward of speech acts such as the asking of a why question are permissible or not at a 
given point in a sequence of argumentation during the argumentation stage of the dialogue. 
     Once again, the reader needs to be reminded that the profiles of dialogue technique is a useful 
tool because it can enable us to avoid going into all the complications of bringing in the 
extensive apparatus of all the rules and requirements of a formal model of dialogue, a task which 
may be simply overwhelming for practical or pedagogical purposes. The profiles method is 
useful in the present case first because it can be used to show the danger posed by the asking of 
the initial pair of why questions that may lead to an infinite dialogue. Second, it shows by means 
of the graph on the left the danger and trickiness of these first two steps in the sequence, each of 
which involves a burden of proof shift that may be legitimate or illegitimate depending on rules 
for the asking and answering the why questions that may be applicable. Third, it shows by means 
of the graph on the right a way of navigating through the obstacles that leaves open an avenue for 
the dialogue to continue in a constructive manner so that it might ultimately arrive at reaching 
the original goal set at the opening stage. 
 
6. The Twelve Steps in the Procedure of Applying the Profiles Method 
 
     To appreciate how the profiles of dialogue technique coordinates the normative and 
descriptive tasks in a way that enables it to combine abstract formal argumentation dialogue 
models with the particulars of an argument presented in a natural language discourse example, 
the procedure of applying a profile to a real case needs to be outlined in a general way. There are 
three parts to the procedure, a part that has both descriptive and interpretive elements combined, 
a normative part and a fault diagnosis part. Each of these three parts has four main steps. 
Henceforth I will call the second part the descriptive part, to contrast it with the normative part, 
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even though much of the work that is carried out in this part concerns the interpretation of the 
natural language text of discourse that provides the evidence.  
     Let’s begin with the four steps in the descriptive part.  
1. First, the argument analyst needs to have a text of discourse, a quotation of the actual text of 
the argument, or argumentative exchange between the two parties, representing the data in a 
given case.  
2. Second, the analyst needs to build an initial argument graph representing the premises and 
conclusions in the sequence of argumentation in the case.  
3. Third, the analyst needs to use the textual evidence to support the claim that the graph fairly 
represents the real argument that is the target of the analysis.  
4. Fourth, the analyst needs to refine the graph, for example by inserting implicit premises or 
conclusions needed to show how the argument makes sense. In this fourth step the analyst will 
need to use argumentation schemes, for example, to find implicit premises that need to be used to 
link parts of the argument together.  
     The aim of these first four steps is to build an argument graph comparable to the ones shown 
on the left in figures 2 and 3. This initial graph represents a reconstruction of the sequence of 
argumentation that supposedly took place in the given case. It is a hypothesis about how to 
reasonably interpret the given argument based on the textual evidence and on the Gricean 
communicative principles (Grice, 1975) represented by the dialogue protocols used to 
reconstruct the sequence of argumentation.  
     Once these first four steps have been carried through, the result should be that a problem is 
posed. Such a problem can be of various kinds. It could represent one of the traditional fallacies, 
such as the fallacy of many questions or the fallacy of begging the question (circular 
argumentation). Or it could be a problem of a different sort, such as an inappropriate shifting 
back and forth of the burden of proof in a way that makes further progress toward resolving the 
conflict of opinion in a given case problematic or even impossible, as things stand. 
     Next we proceed to the normative part of the procedure. This part requires the construction of 
a second argument showing how the sequence of dialogue should proceed in order to avoid the 
problem depicted in the initial graph. The second graph is constructed by using the protocols 
governing which moves are obligatory or permissible for each participant at each move any point 
in the dialogue. These rules can be applied to determine when it is allowable for one participant 
to ask a particular type of question, defined as an appropriate speech act in the formal model of 
dialogue and the permissible options available to the respondent in making its next move.  
5. The first step in the second part of the procedure is for the argument analyst to look at the 
descriptive graph and reconstruct how it ideally should have gone.  
6. The second step is for the argument analyst to build another graph, of the kind shown in 
figures 4 and 5 in the argument graph on the right. The analyst carries through this part of the 
procedure by applying the abstract normative dialogue model to the descriptive graph 
representing how the sequence of moves in the dialogue actually went, according to its 
descriptive reconstruction carried out in the first part of the procedure.  
7. The third step is for the argument analyst to justify the second argument graph is a reasonable 
reconstruction of what should have taken place in the dialogue, using the dialogue rules of the 
normative model.  
8. The fourth step is for the argument analyst to show how the dialogue initiated in the 
problematic descriptive graph could have been carried through in an appropriate sequence of 
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argumentation that would move the dialogue forward toward its communal goal in a cooperative 
manner.  
     Executing this fourth step requires summarizing the applicable protocols and showing how 
they should be applied to the nodes and transitions in the normative argument graph. For 
example, it was shown in the application of the profiles method to the shifting BoP example how 
rules such as the presupposition rule and the BoP rule, need to be applied and combined to 
generate the sequence of argument shown on the right side of the graph in figure 3. 
     Once the four steps in each of the descriptive and normative parts of the procedure have been 
executed, the fault diagnosis part of the procedure combines these two parts. The analyst, in this 
final part of the procedure, needs to examine the two graphs side-by-side and compare one to the 
other. The outcome of the descriptive part of the procedure was to build a graph that displays a 
problem, some sort of difficulty that represents a blocking of the dialogue, or interference with 
its proper progress, that needs to be dealt with.  
9. The first step in this fault diagnosis part of the procedure is to show how the argument graph 
on the right moves forward in a constructive manner towards fulfilling the goal of the dialogue in 
a way that shows how the fault illustrated by the graph on the left side can be repaired.  
10. The second step in this final part of the procedure is to use the evidence provided by the 
descriptive graph along with the normative graph to build a justification for categorizing the 
argumentation fault, error or failure that has been revealed.  
11. The third step is to put forward a hypothesis to diagnose the fault. So, for example, the fault 
may be associated with the general pattern of error or difficulty, such as a traditional informal 
fallacy or a problem of shifting burden of proof, such that the fault can be diagnosed. The 
diagnostic procedure is to use the pair of graphs along with the original text of discourse of the 
case to support the diagnosis evidentially.  
12. The fourth step in the fault diagnosis part of the procedure is to use the comparison between 
the two graphs to find a way to repair the fault.  
     The three-part procedure and its twelve steps are outlined in the activity graph in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
                          Figure 4: Activity Graph of the Twelve-step Procedure 
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As the outcome of the twelve-step procedure the analyst can draw some tentative conclusion 
based on the evidence provided by the twelve steps in the procedure in the form of a general 
hypothesis about what the fault is and how it can be repaired. So instead of merely taking the 
negative approach of merely identifying fallacies as errors or deceptive strategic moves, the 
procedure enables those trained in the technique to be able to mediate in debates and other 
organized real dialogues, and to teach arguers how to improve their argumentation skills by 
diagnosing, solving and even avoiding these problems before they arise. 
 
7. The Normative and Descriptive Parts of the Profiles Method 
 
     Once the argument analyst has constructed an initial descriptive graph representing a 
hypothesis about the sequence of dialogue that supposedly took place, based on the textual 
evidence given in the real example that is being analyzed, CAS can be applied and will 
automatically tell the user whether the sequence represents a legitimate argument graph or not. If 
the user attempts to argue other than by following the CAS protocol, the system will not accept 
that input, because it violates some requirement of the protocol. CAS will not tell the user what 
mistake he or she made, but the CAS could be extended to offer such advice to the user. 
However, CAS can help a user to construct a normative argument graph of the kind shown in the 
right side of figure 5, revealing to the user that the sequence of argumentation represented in the 
graph conforms to the speech acts and protocols of the system. CAS is able to automatically 
perform an argument evaluation, once the user has supplied the required information in an initial 
argument graph, including the ultimate conclusion, the premises accepted by the audience, the 
argumentation schemes applicable in the graph, and so forth. CAS can also help the user to 
improve this initial graph by revealing implicit premises needed to make a given step in the 
argumentation sequence fit a scheme. Also, because CAS has the capability of argument 
invention, it can offer the user information about potential paths of argumentation leading from 
this graph toward the proving of the ultimate conclusion that has been identified by the user in 
the initial graph. Also, CAS can calculate on both sides of the profile to tell whether the 
descriptive argument graph one is a failed proof, and that the normative argument graph is a 
correct proof of the ultimate conclusion to be proved. In other words, computational 
argumentation systems such as CAS enabling the construction and evaluation of argument 
graphs can be applied during parts of the profiles of the twelve-step procedure. 
   The profiles method enables the user in who is attempting to deal with fallacies and other 
argumentation problems to rapidly apply the twelve-step procedure without having to bring in all 
the formal methodology and rules of a computational system such as CAS. The user can apply 
the profiles method in a more direct way by simply using pencil and paper to construct a 
descriptive graph alongside a normative graph, and then compare the two using the twelve step 
profiles procedure as a method. He or she can selectively bring to bear any rules of the system 
that are needed without having to apply all the protocol of the formal model.  
     However, it needs to be recognized that this task is not purely descriptive, and requires a 
normative component and interpretive elements. An automated computational systems such as 
CAS is very valuable for helping us to understand the structure and theory behind the profiles 
method, because such a formal system requires a precise statement of all the required types of 
dialogue rules needed to make the dialectical system into a precisely defined model that could be 
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used, for example, to implement multiagent communications on the Internet between agents, or 
among a group of agents engaging in argumentation with each other. 
     There is also an intermediate step for the user. He or she can use any simple and easy-to-use 
tool of the kind easily found available at no cost on the Internet to construct a diagrammatic 
representation of a given example of argumentation. Such graphic tools as Microsoft Visio, 
GraphML, and so forth, are widely available (Scheuer et al., 2010). They can be used to make 
argument diagrams of the kind illustrated in this paper without requiring any significant time or 
effort to master. No doubt many readers of this paper are already familiar with such tools. 
     It needs to be appreciated that there is a division of labor in applying the profiles method 
described in this paper. The procedural rules and other normative requirements, such as rules for 
turn-taking, rules for putting forward speech acts, rules for replying to speech acts, and so forth, 
built into the formal argumentation system, are necessary to be in the background for argument 
evaluation, argument construction (invention), and for applying the profiles method. These parts 
of the method are mainly normative in nature. But a lot is left up to the user.  
     A formal argument graphing system such as CAS requires the user to interpret the argument 
in the given case, based on the textual evidence provided by the example. In CAS, for example, 
the user has to start by making an argument diagram in the form of a graph that has the ultimate 
conclusion of the sequence of argumentation represented as the root node in the graph. This 
means that the user has to start out by deciding what the issue of the persuasion dialogue is, by 
inputting a proposition that is being claimed or disputed into the system. Of course, this decision 
depends on how the given argument is to be interpreted, based on the evidence from the textual 
details of the case, and this interpretation can of course be disputed by someone who disagrees 
with this interpretation. In such a case, we ascend to a metalevel dialogue, where the two 
argument analysts have a conflict of opinions about which of their interpretations is better. Such 
a dialogue can, of course, be modeled as a persuasion dialogue. To help find and repair problems 
in such a dialogue, a third argument analyst can use the profiles method. As described in the 
twelve-step procedure, the arguments on both sides need to be compared and weighed against 
each other, and the textual evidence of the case needs to be marshaled to support the contentions 
on both sides. Cases of three party dialogues of this sort are familiar in legal argumentation, but 
it has to be outside of the scope of this paper to explore these kinds of applications of the profiles 
method in greater depth. Hamblin (1970, 256) was aware of the need to complement the formal 
study of dialectical systems with the descriptive study of dialogues such as parliamentary 
debates, cross-examinations and other stylized argumentative communication frameworks. It 
should be noted that CAS has been widely applied to test cases in legal argumentation, even 
though it can be applied to other domains such as everyday conversational argumentation in 
other specially constructed frameworks such as forensic debates. It can be applied to 
argumentation broadly across all such domains, but requires care to input different settings in 
order to evaluate argumentation in diverse legal and extra-legal settings. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
     The essence of the profiles method is revealed by how it was applied as shown in figures 2 
and 3. Each figure represents a pair of graphs. Each graph represents a sequence of dialogue. The 
graph on the left represents how the sequence actually went in the example chosen for analysis. 
The graph on the right represents a normative analysis of how the sequence of questions and 
replies should ideally proceed, according to the protocol for this type of dialogue. The graph on 
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the left it is mapped into the one on the right, so that a comparison can be made to determine 
what is missing or otherwise problematic in the sequence displayed by the graph on the left. The 
profiles method is essentially a fault diagnosis tool that can be applied to cases of problematic 
argumentation such as an illicit shifting of a burden of proof, or to fallacies that have a dialectical 
aspect, such as the fallacy of many questions.   
     What has been shown is how the profiles tool works at a middle level between the descriptive 
(and interpretive) and normative parts of the task of identifying, analyzing and repairing 
argumentation problems such as those associated with traditional informal fallacies. The profile 
of dialogue is the connector between the two graphs. How we evaluate the argument is by means 
of a graph G1 mapped into a graph G2. The descriptive graph G1 is mapped into the normative 
graph G2, and the pair of them constitutes the basis of the profiles of dialogue method used to 
isolate, identify, and analyze the fallacy, or in any event the dialectical problem that is at the 
basis of the difficulty. Given such a pair of graphs, the argument evaluator can then carry out a 
diagnosis of what is the problem shown in G1, and how the problem can be reconfigured so that a 
solution is displayed in G2. The argument evaluator can then propose the solution to the problem 
as a hypothesis. Another argument evaluator could propose a competing hypothesis, for example 
one based on a different descriptive graph based on an alternative interpretation of the text.  
     How the general procedure of argument analysis works by using the profiles tool is shown in 
figure 5. The descriptive graph G1 and the normative graph G2 are combined in applying the 
profiles technique to the text of discourse in a given case. 
 
 
 
                     Figure 5: Evaluation Procedure Using a Profile of Dialogue. 
 
     The normative/descriptive part of the task is represented at the top of the figure, representing 
a case where an argument analyst has drawn up an argument graph to represent an argument, or 
sequence of argumentation, found in a natural language text of discourse. This type of argument 
graph represents a starting point of the twelve-step profiles procedure that needs to begin with 
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the argument analyst constructing a rough beginning interpretation of the argument in the given 
discourse using an argument graph. In the application of the profiles technique to a particular 
example, this part of the argumentation is represented by a sequence of argumentation moves 
that presumably took place during the exchange of arguments. In figures 2 and 3 it is represented 
by the descriptive graph that appears on the left of the figure.  
     To the right of this argument graph in a given case there is also a normative argument graph. 
Now the question is, where does the information come in that provides the data for the normative 
evaluation? To see this, we have to look at in figure 5. It starts with a formal dialogue system 
that has a set of pre and post-conditions determining how speech acts can be used as moves in 
the dialogue by the participating agents. But what is needed for the evaluation is a sequence of 
moves in the argumentation stage where the argumentation in question was put forward. This 
provides us with the information that we need to construct a profile of dialogue. It is the 
comparison of these two profiles by the argument analyst that is the of the fault diagnosis and 
repair procedure.  
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